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THE KNIGHT’S CODE, NOT HIS LANCE 
Jamie A. Williamson* 
Inherent in the application of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) is finding the right balance between military necessity and humanita-
rian considerations. In doing so, the parties to the conflict will be called 
upon to interpret core principles and standards of IHL as they are applied 
in the conduct of military operations. At times, there might be disagreement 
as to the exact meaning and parameters of certain aspects of IHL. This pa-
per argues against the suggestions by some commentators that in some sit-
uations, such interpretation of the law could be viewed as a form of “law-
fare.” It will also argue that a manipulation by belligerents of the law, for 
instance by hiding amongst the civilian population, is better described as a 
war crime than an act of lawfare. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the outbreak of armed conflicts, IHL, also known as the Laws of 
War, becomes the regulating legal framework for the parties to the conflict. 
This body of law includes the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Addi-
tional Protocols of 1977 and 2005, the Law of the Hague, and is also de-
fined under customary international law. Because the laws of armed conflict 
call notably for a balancing act between military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations, there are at times differences in their interpretation, as with 
any other body of law, although the reach of most rules and principles are 
generally accepted. There is a wide agreement between States, military ac-
tors, humanitarians, academia, and other practitioners as to their meaning 
and how they should be applied in conflict. In fact, the Geneva Conventions 
  
 *  Jamie A. Williamson is the Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red 
Cross Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada. The views and opinions ex-
pressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.  
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are the only international treaties that have been universally ratified; all 
states have thus acquiesced to their principles and rules.  
Yet, consensus on the understanding of certain principles, such as 
proportionality and precaution, is not always that easy to reach. Also, the 
evolving nature of armed conflicts regularly tests IHL and its interpretation, 
to the extent that ―in today‘s asymmetric postcolonial wars, the terrain be-
neath a soldier‘s interpretations of what is and is not appropriate is constant-
ly shifting.‖1  
To the outsider, such terms as ―acceptable‖ collateral damage must 
seem like an oxymoron. Yet this is the world of jus in bello, a world that 
recognizes that in armed conflict there will be loss of life and damage to 
property—incidents that have no place in times of peace. IHL attempts to 
limit the suffering caused by conflict and hostilities by inserting certain ba-
sics of humanity and minimum standards of behavior, whilst allowing the 
parties to the conflict to achieve their military objectives. IHL is about com-
promise, between the humanitarian and military necessity.2 
In conflicts, there are situations where one of the belligerents, in de-
fending and justifying its chosen military strategy as respecting IHL, will 
put forward a legal interpretation of the relevant principle that may seem at 
odds with that held by other interested parties, be they military or humanita-
rian. Thus, for instance, between military commanders and humanitarian 
workers, there might be a different understanding of that which constitutes 
acceptable collateral damage, simply because their respective interpretations 
of the principle of proportionality are taken from different standpoints. The 
former seek to accomplish their mission, which is to defeat the adversary, 
whereas the latter seek principally to prevent or limit civilian casualties and 
damage. Difference or even disagreement in the interpretation of IHL prin-
ciples and standards is part of its very fabric, as is the case for any body of 
law. Yet, differences or disagreement over the interpretation of the law does 
not amount to an act of waging war, at least as is commonly understood.  
Based on this premise, I argue against the application of the concept 
of ―lawfare‖ to describe a process of interpretation, which is inherent to the 
application of any laws, including the laws of war. I also argue that an act of 
―lawfare‖ defined by some commentators as a manipulation by belligerents 
of the law, for instance by hiding amongst the civilian population and lead-
ing the other party to commit possible violations of IHL, is better described 
as a war crime than an act of lawfare. 
  
 1 DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 133 (2006). 
 2 See JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 xxxiv (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & 
Bruno Zimmerman eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) (stating that the Geneva Conven-
tions aim to ―spread an ideal of mutual aid and cooperation‖ to advance peace and the good-
will of men). 
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II.  TO DEFINE IS TO LIMIT 
A brief review of the ever expanding writings on and references to 
the term ―lawfare‖ shows that there seems to be no generally agreed upon 
definition.3 But, whilst the meaning of lawfare is a work in progress, as 
many of the speakers at this conference have indicated, this term is making 
its way into common parlance. Lawfare is being cited in myriad contexts to 
describe any number of actions by individuals or groups. Such usages are 
not being limited to armed conflicts.  
It is not the aim of this presentation to advance a definition of law-
fare, or to limit the meaning of a term that has yet to make its way into the 
Oxford Concise Dictionary. Indeed, there might even be multiple meanings 
attached to the term ―lawfare,‖ which have transmogrified over the past few 
years.  
A thread common to most definitions appears to be that lawfare is 
more often than not associated with accusations that the law is being mani-
pulated and exploited in an overtly negative manner, rather than simply as a 
―lawful‖ tool or means to achieve a desired result. For some commentators, 
lawfare is viewed as the violations of the rules of war in order to exploit the 
non-violating military‘s compliance,4 in other words ―lawfare can be used to 
goad American forces into violations of the Law of Armed Combat, which 
are then used against the United States in the court of world opinion.‖5 For 
one school of thought, therefore, lawfare is a method of war, preferred by 
  
 3 This should come as no surprise given that the coining of the term appears to be fairly 
recent, dating back from 1999–2001. See QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI , UNRESTRICTED 
WARFARE (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Feb. 1999), available at 
http://redreform.com/unrestrictedwarfare.htm (discussing ―other means and methods used to 
fight a non-military war‖ including psychological warfare, smuggling warfare, and media 
warfare among others); see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: 
Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, 
John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http:// 
www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.
pdf (defining lawfare as ―the use of law as a weapon of war‖). 
 4 See Kenneth Anderson, Battlefield Robots as a Technological Response to “Lawfare,” 
and the Limits to Technological Counters to Bad Behavior, OPINIO JURIS (May 22, 2008), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/05/22/battlefield-robots-as-a-technological-response-to-lawfare-
and-the-limits-to-technological-counters-to-bad-behavior/ (―Indeed, one way to define ‗law-
fare‘ (at least on the battlefield, and leaving aside other uses of the term) is systematic beha-
vioral violations of the rules of war; violations of law planned through advance study of the 
laws of war for the purpose of predicting how law-abiding military forces will behave; viola-
tions undertaken in order to exploit the non-violating military‘s compliance by forcing them 
to seek, to their own military disadvantage, to protect civilians put at risk by these behaviors; 
and intending such violations as a behavioral counter to superior military forces, including 
superior yet law-compliant, technology and weapons systems.‖). 
 
5 Council on Foreign Relations, Lawfare: The Latest in Asymmetries, CFR.ORG (Mar. 18, 
2003), http://www.cfr.org/publication/5772/lawfare_the_latest_in_asymmetries.html?id=57 
72. 
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non-state actors and organized armed groups, seeking to create through the 
manipulation of the law situations casting a shadow over the actions of con-
ventional armed forces, even if these actions comply fully with the laws of 
war.  
As Dunlap argues, lawfare is the  
[E]xploitation of real, perceived, or even orchestrated incidents of 
law-of-war violations being employed as an unconventional means 
of confronting American military power. Make it appear that the 
United States is fighting in an illegal or immoral way, and the dam-
age inflicted upon the public support the forces of a democracy 
need to wage war is as real as any caused by a traditional defeat.6  
It has been opined that such goading, exploitation of situations and allega-
tions of violations of IHL, would or could place strangleholds on the mili-
tary engagements of the conventional fighting forces, undermining strate-
gies, and making winning the hearts and minds of the local populations an 
insurmountable struggle.7  
Lawfare, in the sense given by Dunlap and others, is not the same as 
interpreting jus in bello. The exploitation of an alleged violation of war, to 
discredit the goaded party, might be a powerful weapon, but as some speak-
ers noted, it is more akin to a form of info ops, of mediatisation by one party 
to discredit another. That one party to an armed conflict hides behind civi-
lian protection to launch military attacks is simply a potential violation of 
IHL. It is therefore important to distinguish between an attempt to misuse 
the law and the legal and operational process of interpretation of the law, 
which is at the heart of IHL.  
  
 6 See, e.g., Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Amid Warfare, THE WASH. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2007, at A19, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/ 
03/lawfare-amid-warfare/?page=1. 
 7 See id. (―Establishing a paradigm of ‗zero tolerance‘ for casualties may well come back 
to haunt us in yet another way. Specifically, it encourages the enemy to do exactly what we 
do not want them to do: surround themselves with innocent civilians so as to virtually im-
munize themselves from attack. It creates a sanctuary that the bad guys are not entitled to 
enjoy, and sends them exactly the wrong message. International law is the friend of civilized 
societies and the military forces they field. However, if we impose restraints as a matter of 
policy in a misguided attempt to ‗improve‘ upon it, we play into the hands of those who 
would use it to wage lawfare against us.‖); See also Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 
5 (―Armed combatants may conceal weaponry or themselves amongst civilians, encouraging 
attacks that can be used as propaganda against American forces. This can have a dramatic 
effect on the use of American air power, making commanders reticent to attack targets and 
dragging out the conflict. Too much concern over the legality of each and every decision can 
be harmful to soldiers involved in ground combat as well.‖).  
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III.  A QUARREL ABOUT THE LAW IS NOT LAWFARE 
As already mentioned, in times of armed conflict, states have 
agreed to be governed by the laws of war, which limit the means and me-
thods of warfare and protect certain categories of persons and property. 
With the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions, states have sent 
out the strong message that they intend to abide by their International Hu-
manitarian Law obligations as they engage in hostilities. Non-state actors 
are also encouraged to bring into force IHL through special agreements.8  
Respecting IHL and ensuring its respect is at the core of the Geneva 
Conventions.9 States are to disseminate the text of the Conventions in times 
of peace and war as widely as possible, in particular in military programs,10 
and to adopt necessary legislation to effectively repress and suppress viola-
tions of IHL.11 In addition to general requirements, Additional Protocol I 
also requires states to ensure that legal advisers are available when neces-
sary to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the applica-
tion of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol and on the appropriate instruc-
tion to give to the armed forces.12 Moreover, military commanders are to 
  
 8 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] (stating that 
parties to a conflict should ―endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all 
or part of the other provisions of the present Convention‖). 
 9 See id. art. 1(―The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect 
for the present Convention in all circumstances.‖); see also Protocol Additional to the Gene-
va Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I] 
(―The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Protocol in 
all circumstances.‖). 
 10 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II] ; see also 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 8, art. 127; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 73 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 83 (―The High 
Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of 
the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries.‖). 
 11 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 49; see also Geneva Convention II, supra 
note 10, art. 50; see also Geneva Convention III, supra note 8, art. 129; see also Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 10, art. 146; see also Geneva Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 85 
(―Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts 
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention.‖). 
 12 See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 82 (―The High Contracting Parties at all times, 
and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisors are 
available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the 
application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be 
given to the armed forces on this subject.‖). 
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ensure that armed forces under their command are aware of their IHL obli-
gations.13 Commanders are to prevent their subordinates from committing 
violations of IHL and to institute necessary disciplinary or penal actions, 
whichever is appropriate, against any violator.14  
Through dissemination, training, presence of legal advisers, and un-
derscoring responsibility on commanders, the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols have thus placed understanding of the law at the center of IHL. In 
so doing, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions aimed to generate the ref-
lex among properly trained combatants to integrate IHL as part of their 
strategy and modalities of warfare. Before launching an attack or as they do 
so, choosing means and methods compliant with the laws of war should be 
an integral part of the thinking and action.  
There are important decisions to be made in the planning and the 
execution of an attack, in deciding whether the damage to civilian objects or 
injury to civilians would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.15 Many of these decisions will turn on how 
respective armed forces interpret such terms as ―feasible precautions,‖ ―ne-
cessary precaution,‖ ―excessive injury and damage,‖ ―effective advance 
warning,‖ and ―maximum extent feasible.‖ Defining what constitutes a mili-
tary objective or unnecessary suffering, has also invited lengthy debates and 
treatise, whether in academia, amongst practitioners, in judicial proceed-
ings, or as part of lessons learnt cycles.16  
The meaning of most IHL principles and standards at their core has 
in fact been agreed upon and, in most military operations, there is in reality 
little room to maneuver in how the laws of war are applied. Yet, of course, 
in the fog of modern day armed conflicts, situations arise every day where 
the answer for the planner or the Judge Advocate General in the field will 
be less clear-cut. A decision taken in the heat of a complex operation may 
sometimes be toeing the line between the lawful and unlawful under IHL. 
The military lawyer or commander might be called upon to defend the le-
gality of the operation. This not to say, though, that the law is being used as 
a tool or a weapon of war.  
  
 13 See id. art. 83 (mandating High Contracting Parties to require a study of the Conven-
tions in their programs of military instruction). 
 14 See id. art. 87 (requiring military commanders ―to prevent and, where necessary, to 
suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Pro-
tocol‖). 
 15 See id. art. 51(5) (discussing protection of the civilian population and types of attacks on 
civilian population that are to be considered as indiscriminate). 
 16 For example, one discussion on what constitutes a military objective notes that ―the API 
military objective definition/test contains various elements that require explanation . . . The 
words ‗nature, location, purpose or use‘ allow wide discretion but are subject to qualifica-
tions stated in the definition/test.‖ INT‘L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP‘T, OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 20 (Capt. Brian Bill & Maj. Jeremy Marsh eds., 2010). 
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The interpretation of some parts of IHL can certainly give rise to 
much legal debate, as demonstrated over the last few years with the process 
of clarifying the notion of ―direct participation in hostilities.‖ Under IHL, 
attacks may only be directed against combatants, and not against civilians,17 
therefore parties to a conflict must distinguish  between civilians and com-
batants at all times. However, in today‘s so-called asymmetric conflicts, 
there has been not only an increased involvement of civilians in acts closely 
related to actual combat, but also a lessening distinction between civilians 
and belligerents, especially on the side of non-state actors involved in non-
international armed conflicts. With this blurring of actors, determining who 
is and who is not a protected civilian, and who is therefore a lawful target, 
becomes that much more complex. This also obviously increases the risk of 
those civilians entitled to protection directly in harm‘s way during the hos-
tilities. Under IHL, civilians can lose their protection from direct attack 
when and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.18  
But, without a clear definition of what constitutes ―direct participa-
tion in hostilities‖ under IHL, the waters were muddy when assessing under 
which circumstances a civilian lost his protection. To remedy this situation, 
in 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued its ―Interpre-
tive Guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under Inter-
  
 17 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 48, 51(1), 52(2); see Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts art. 13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Protocol II] (prohibiting attack and spread of terror among civilian populations); see 
also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
[ICRC], CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8 (2005) (―Rule 2. Acts or threats 
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population 
are prohibited.‖); see also INT‘L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP‘T, supra note 16, at 11 (―Some-
times referred to as the principle of discrimination, this principle requires that combatants be 
distinguished from civilians, and that military objectives be distinguished from protected 
property or protected places. In keeping with this ‗grandfather‘ principle of the [Laws Of 
War], parties to a conflict must direct their operations only against combatants and military 
objectives.‖) (emphasis in original). 
 18 See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 51(3); see also Geneva Protocol II, supra note 
17, art. 13(3) (―Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.‖); see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & 
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 17, at 19 (―Rule 6. Civilians are protected against attack 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.‖). The immunity from direct 
attack to which civilians are entitled is one of the lynchpins of IHL. Civilians do not lose 
immunity for mere contribution to the general war effort carried out far from the battlefield. 
See also JEAN PICTET, supra note 2, at 618, ¶ 3 (―The immunity afforded individual civilians 
is subject to an overriding condition, namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts. Hostile 
acts should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause 
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.‖). 
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national Humanitarian Law.‖19 The Guidance represented the outcome of an 
expert process conducted from 2003 to 2008, during which several meetings 
were held to bring together nearly fifty legal experts.20 The debate between 
experts has continued in subsequent publications,21 with some commenta-
tors suggesting that the debates between the various lawyers was a form of 
lawfare.22  
If such clarification processes on the interpretation and clarification 
of IHL can come under the broad umbrella of lawfare, one could argue that 
just about any proceeding, judicial, academic, or operational where the ex-
act meaning of IHL terms is at issue could be viewed as lawfare. To enter-
tain such a position would imply that all forms of legal debate addressing 
possible lacunae and clarifying areas of law are from now on to be viewed 
as ―method of war.‖ Practitioners, military and humanitarian, would be ac-
  
 19 See generally NILS MELZER, INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009). 
 20 See id. at 9–10 (discussing the many sources from which the Interpretive Guidance drew 
in formulating its recommendations). While the experts came from academic, military, go-
vernmental and non-governmental circles, all attended in personal capacities. The Guidance 
is influenced by expert discussions, but does not necessarily reflect a majority opinion of the 
participating experts. As the various expert meeting reports show, the experts expressed 
many diverse views regarding this delicate and complex aspect of IHL. 
 21 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction 
to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 637, 638–640 (2009) (listing ―four partially-
overlapping, partially-conflicting critical perspectives applied to any concrete interpretation 
of DPH—or any other central concept in IHL‖); see also Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: 
Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive 
Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 641, 643 (2009) (criticizing the way in which the 
Interpretive Guidance handles the issue of ―organized armed groups‖); see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 697, 698 (2009) (stating that ―key features of the [Interpretive] 
Guidance have proven highly controversial‖); see also Bill Boothby, “And for Such Times 
As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 
741, 743 (2009) (―There are three main grounds on which the ICRC‘s analysis in the Inter-
pretive Guidance can be criticized.‖); see also W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 769, 784 (2009) (criticizing Section IX of the Interpretive Guid-
ance); see also Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: 
A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’S Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 831, 834 (2009) (responding to four 
critiques of the ICRC‘s Interpretive Guidance presented by other scholars). 
 22 See Jack Goldsmith, Thoughts on “Lawfare”, LAWFAREBLOG, (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:24 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/thoughts-on-lawfare/ (describing lawfare as ―a war in 
which battles take place across the ocean; between proponents and opponents of the Gold-
stone Report; between the ICRC and government lawyers about the meaning and applicabili-
ty of ‗direct participation of hostilities‘; and among lawyers representing alleged terrorists, 
government lawyers, and judges in the D.C. circuit‖). 
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cused of lawfare whenever there were exchanges or disagreement on the 
definition of one concept or principle. This would certainly be taking the 
idea of lawfare too far, and we should caution against any creep in this di-
rection.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it should be underscored that although there might be 
disagreement as to the exact meaning and reach of a particular IHL prin-
ciple, there is nothing untoward in this. Jus in bello is the code by which all 
fighters must abide; it is not a complement or alternative to the lance. This 
distinction is important, and should not be ignored.  Although one party‘s 
reading of the law might sit uncomfortably with other interested parties, this 
is simply the reality of war, and the nature of the laws of war, to find the 
right balance between military necessity and humanity.  
 
